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Dancing in the Dark:
The Eighth Circuit's Interpretation of the
Establishment Clause in Clayton by Clayton v. Place
JEFFBEY A. LEON*
"It's not just about a dance. Not anymore."'
INTRODUCTION
The high school dance has been an integral part of the American teen-
age social scene for the last forty years. It has become an institution which
has been memorialized in countless books, movies and songs; and has been
the subject of a nostalgia craze spawned by the Stephen Spielberg motion
picture Back to the Future.2 But probably nothing better certifies the high
school dance as a bona fide part of the American landscape than the success
of the motion picture Footloose.3
Footloose is the story of the struggle of high school students to sponsor
a dance in a small town in Colorado that had passed an ordinance forbidding
dancing. 4 Most viewers probably believe that bans on dancing do not exist
outside the realm of celluloid.' Yet the struggle played out in the movie
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloormngton; B.A., 1987,
University of Redlands.
1. Ren MaeCormack, character in the motion picture Footloose (Paramount Pictures
1984).
2. (Universal Pictures 1985).
3. (Paramount Pictures 1984).
4. The students were led by the character Ren MacCormack. In the climactic scene, Ren
MacCormack attempted to persuade the town council to rescind the dance ban. He was
rebuffed by the town's reverend, who was also a member of the town council. The reverend
stated:
Even if this was not a law, which it is, I'm afraid I would have a lot of difficulty
endorsing an enterprise [dancing] which is as fraught with genuine peril as I
believe this one to be. Besides the liquor and the drugs which always seem to
accompany such an event, the thing [that] distresses me even more is the
spiritual corruption that can be involved. These dances and this kind of music
can be destructive, and Ren, I'm afraid you are going to find that most of the
people in our community are going to agree with me on this.
Footloose (Paramount Pictures 1984). The reverend's religious beliefs are inconsistent with the
views and practices of contemporary secular American society. The movie plays on this fact,
creating a sense that the town's position was somehow unjust.
5. "[Footloose's] plot seemed a bit farfetched. After all, no one in this day and age-no
matter how religiously motivated-really believes dancing is evil." Indiana Daily Student, Apr.
19, 1990, § I, at 7, col. I. Another paper quipped that the fact "[t]hat there are still places
vexed by such matters [as dancing] in a time of AIDS, global warming, the world's present
geopolitical reordering seems almost comedic." Newsday, May 10, 1990, § II, at 4 (LEXIS,
Nexis library, Currnt file).
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Footloose has become all too real to the high school students of the town
of Purdy, Missouri.
The school system of Purdy, Missouri, has a longstanding prohibition
against social dancing. This ban was successfully challenged on the basis of
the establishment clause in Clayton by Clayton v. Place.6 An appeal to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals led to a reversal.7 A petition for a rehearing
en banc was demed 5-4,8 as was a petition for the writ of certiorari before
the United States Supreme Court.9
This Note discusses the constitutionality of the Purdy dance ban in the
context of the Eighth Circuit's disposition of the Clayton case. Part I sets
out the factual and procedural history of the struggle to rescind the dance
ban. Part II introduces the Supreme Court's basic establishment clause
inquiry, known as the Lemon test. Part III utilizes the Lemon test, and
related inquiries developed by the Court, to analyze and criticize the Eighth
Circuit's disposition of the students' establishment clause claim. Finally,
this Note concludes that the Eighth Circuit erred in its application of
establishment clause methodology.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Purdy is a small community' located in the southwestern corner of the
State of Missouri. The religious community has always wielded significant
control over the operation of the Purdy public schools. The extent of this
control is evidenced by the existence of "school prayer and Bible songs in
the late 1970's, an ongoing tradition of prayers before athletic contests, and
an [sic] baccalaureate ceremony which is conducted like a church service.""
6. 690 F Supp. 850 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), reh'g en banc
denied, 889 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990). "The case [filed
by high school students in Purdy, Missouri] drew wide attention in part because of the
similarities to the hit motion picture 'Footloose' " Chicago Tribune, Sept. 3, 1989, § 1, at 6,
col. 3. This similarity was not lost on the Purdy High students, who held a rally which
"climaxed when dozens of Purdy youths rushed in front of the crowd to dance to the theme
song from Footloose " L.A. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, § 1, at 2, col. 2.
The similarity to the Footloose motion picture has thrust the Purdy dance ban into the
national media. The dance ban "has been described by publications throughout the country
including Playboy. Media quenes have come from Australia and Taiwan, sympathetic calls
from high school students around the nation, letters of support from Hollywood producers
and, the ultimate ignominy, a smirking putdown from Saturday Night Live." Newsday, May
10, 1990, § II, at 4 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file).
7 Clayton, 884 F.2d 376.
8. Clayton, 889 F.2d 192.
9. Clayton, 110 S. Ct. 1811.
10. "There are 1200 to 1400 registered voters in the Purdy R-2 School District." Brief for
Appellees at I, Clayton by Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-2493)
[hereinafter Brief], rev'g 690 F Supp. 850 (W.D. Mo. 1988), reh'g en banc denied, 889 F.2d
192 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
i1. Brief, supra note 10, at 1.
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Another manifestation of the religious community's influence with the
School Board is the existence of Purdy R-2 School District Rule 502.29,
which states in part that "[s]chool dances are not authorized and school
premises shall not be used for purposes of conducting a dance.' ' 2 While
the rule appears to prohibit all forms of dancing, "artistic dancing" and
square dancing have been allowed by the School Board. 3 While it is difficult
to attribute enactment of the dance ban directly to the town's religious
community, 14 the district court found a record replete with instances where
the religious community in Purdy was responsible for the continued existence
of Rule 502.29.15
Prior to Clayton, residents of Purdy attempted several times to rescind
Rule 502.29.16 Because these attempts have failed, students have been forced
to split the prom dance into on-campus/off-campus activities. For the past
several years, a "banquet" has been held for the juniors and semors of
Purdy High School, with teachers acting as chaperones. 7 The prom is then
held off school grounds (often in neighboring communities) without teacher
chaperoning or school funding. A school-sponsored breakfast has often
followed the prom at about 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. Several times the banquet
was held in Springfield, a sixty mile drive from Purdy 11 However, dissat-
isfaction with the split prom prompted some students and their parents to
lobby for rescission of Rule 502.29. The parents expressed strong concern
about the students "dnv[ing] long distances on unfamiliar roads to attend
'unofficial' school dances."' 19 The Clayton lawsuit was filed after an attempt
to rescind the rule failed during the 1985-86 academic year. 20
At trial, the district court noted that parents were told, in a January,
1986 meeting with Superintendent Richard M. Place, that they should not
be surprised at the widespread opposition to social dancing since 'this is
a conservative, religious community ' When asked if it were the Baptists
that opposed dancing, Superintendent Place stated, 'Let's just say protes-
tants. ' ' 2' Prior to that Board meeting, at least three of the six Board
members had told the parents that they opposed the proposed change on
12. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 852.
13. Brief, supra note 10, at 2. The brief went on to note that "[n]ot surprisingly, church
policy sanctions artistic dancing and square dancing." Id.
14. "Although the record does not indicate when the rule was enacted, the parties agree
it has been in place for a long time." Clayton, 884 F.2d at 377.
15. See infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
16. See Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 852.
17. Id. at 854 (Teachers even chaperone the banquet when it is held off-campus.).
18. Id.
19. Brief, supra note 10, at 4. This concern was also evidenced in Footloose, which weaves
a drunk-driving death into the plot. The movie hints that the death occurred because the
students had to drive to another town in order to dance.
20. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 852.
21. Id.
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religious grounds,2 while the Board President "stated that the last time the
dance issue was brought up it generated a lot of heat. '23
Undaunted, a group of students requested a re-examination of the dance
ban at a February 10, 1986 School Board meeting. The students wanted to
hold a dance to be sponsored by Students Against Drunk Driving (SADD).Y
A mnister present at the meeting requested and received time to prepare a
response to the students' request. 2
The students' request spurred into action the "Ministerial Alliance" (the
"Alliance"), a group comprising the five fundamentalist Christian churches
located in Purdy Each of the Alliance churches required its congregation
members to abstain from social dancing. 26 Each Alliance minister, in re-
sponse to the students' request, promised to preach against the evils of
dancing in their Sunday sermon and to mobilize their congregation to attend
the School Board meeting. 27 In addition, several ministers of the Alliance
privately lobbied members of the School Board. 2
22. Id. Board member Keeling told a parent prior to the February 10, 1986 meeting that
he opposed changing the rule because "his church preached it was wrong and immoral to
dance," and later told another parent "that he did not believe in dancing because he was
taught it was wrong." Id. at 852-53. Board member Negre told yet another parent that "his
church is opposed to dancing." Id. at 853. After the February 10, 1986 Board meeting, Board
member Henderson spoke to his church and promised that he would not vote for allowing
social dancing. Id.
23. Id. at 852. This was the position of Board President Garrett, while Board member
Terry "stated that he had voted for the dance in the past but caught so much 'flak' from the
rmnsters that he would vote against it this time." Id. at 853.
24. Id. at 852.
25. Id.
26. The scriptural validity of the opposition to dancing is irrelevant. Biblical passages are
subject to varying interpretations. Any attempt by a court to explicate a "correct" interpretation
would cause excessive entanglement with religion by stating an official government position
on matters that are purely spiritual. The fact that each church requires abstention from dancing
as a membership requirement suffices to prove a religious basis for that opposition. [Eds.
note-Reference to the "Alliance" has no connection with the Christian & Missionary Alliance
denomination.]
27. The congregation of the First Baptist Church discussed its opposition to rescinding the
prohibition against dancing and prayed for the soul of one of the congregation members who
supported the students' position. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 853. The First Assembly of God
requires that members "must agree to be separate from worldliness-which includes dancing."
Id. In addition, the minister of the First Assembly stated that he would refer all members
who engaged in social dancing to the presbyters for counseling. Id. The reverend of the Free
Will Baptist Church "believes and preaches that social dancing is sinful, scripturally prohibited,
and possibly satanic. He has discussed this view with church members, has preached against
dancing from the pulpit and would have a private counseling session with a member of his
congregation who engaged in social dancing." Id. Opposition to the dance issue was also
discussed in the services of the Macedonia Free Will Baptist Church, and the minister stated
that he felt social dancing to be "inappropriate behavior." Id.
The positions of the various churches indicate the amount of social and political influence
the religious community wields in Purdy. The community's opposition to dancing can only be
explained in reference to the positions taken by the various denominations.
28. Id.
[Vol. 66:315
DANCING IN THE DARK
The Board finally met to consider the students' request on March 10,
1986. The largest crowd ever to attend a School Board meeting was present-
250-400 people, nearly thirty percent of the registered voters in the Purdy
R-2 School District.29 While "No direct mention was made of religion per
se at the meeting,"30 a letter from the Ministerial Alliance was read in full
by one of the Alliance ministers. The minister then asked the people who
opposed dancing to stand. "The overwhelming majority of people stood in
opposition to changing the rule."' 3' The School Board later met in closed
session and, without a formal vote, decided to leave the rule unaltered.32
Because the Board refused to sponsor a dance, a group of parents decided
to rent the school and sponsor a dance themselves. Such rentals for
nonschool functions were commonplace. School Board policy allowed the
school to be rented on all days "except on Wednesday and Sunday evenings.
Wednesday and Sunday are traditional church nights." 33
On April 18, 1986, the parents filed their application to rent the school
for purposes of holding a dance. The School Board called a meeting on
April 29, at which the Board suspended its rental policy in a special closed
session. 4 Despite the Board's decision not to rent to any outside groups,
the school building and grounds have been used since then for nonschool
softball athletic leagues, pick-up basketball games and even an exhibition
donkey basketball game .3 The district court found the Board's actions on
the rental request "[p]articularly significant." '36
With all avenues foreclosed by the School Board, the parents instituted
an action on behalf of their children in United States District Court
challenging the constitutionality of Rule 502.29. The parents alleged that
the ban violated the establishment clause of the first amendment of the
United States Constitution.37 The district court agreed, finding that the rule
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 853-54.
35. Id. at 854.
36. Id. at .855. The court stated:
There would be no added cost to the school, no supervision by teachers and no
classroom time attributed to extracurricular activities. Yet the school board called
an emergency meeting to do away with the entire rental policy rather than allow
dancing in the school. It is one thing to be opposed to the school itself sponsoring
and paying for an extracurricular activity and quite another to prohibit social
dancing on school property. It is clear to the Court that the reasons propounded
by the majority were a mere pretext for the real religious reasomng. Thus, there
is no valid secular purpose to having Rule 502.29.
Id.
37. Id. The first amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion " U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. This language has
become known as the establishment clause.
1990]
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violated all three prongs of the Lemon test.3"
The court found that the Board members' disavowals of religious intent
lacked credibility 39 The court specifically noted that "the board's courtroom
statements that they accepted the minister's statements at face value defy
reality. It is unbelievable that 300-400 people came to the school board
meeting to protest the added expense of 1 or 2 dances or the increased
responsibility of teachers. ' 40
As a result of the district court's ruling, three dances were held at the
high school without incident.41 Despite the benign effect of three school-
sponsored dances, the School Board appealed the ruling of the district court
to the Eighth Circuit, which reversed.4 2 An appeal from the students for a
rehearing en banc was denied 5-4, drawing a strongly-worded dissent. 43 The
Supreme Court declined to grant Clayton's petition for certiorari,4 thus
allowing the no-dance rule to remain in effect.
II. THE SUPREME CouRT's ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE METHODOLOGY
AND THE LEMON TEST
Most of the Court's establishment clause methodology is a product of
the last forty years. 45 The Court's current approach to establishment clause
cases is known as the Lemon test." The Lemon test is a refined version of
38. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 854-56. For an extended discussion of the Lemon test, see
infra notes 45-60 and accompanying text. For a discussion and analysis of the Lemon test as
it was applied to the facts of Clayton, see mnfra notes 61-218 and accompanying text.
39. The School Board argued that the rule had no religious significance; rather, the rule
was seen by the Board as a reflection of Purdy's "cultural conservatism." Clayton, 690 F
Supp. at 851. The district court judge rejected the Board's assertion by concluding that "[t]he
board members were not particularly credible, either in demeanor or in the substance of their
testimony." Id. at 855. See generally id. at 854-55 (describing in detail the reasons why the
court found the testimony of each member of the School Board "incredible").
40. Id. at 855 (emphasis added).
41. USA Today, Apr. 17, 1990, § A, at 3, col. 6 ("Students held three school dances
without mishap since the ban was first struck down in 1988 "). For a description of the
school's first dance, see Chicago Tribune, Dec. 12, 1988, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
42. Clayton, 884 F.2d 376.
43. Clayton, 889 F.2d 192, 193 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
44. Clayton, 110 S. Ct. 1811.
45. "Despite its place of special pronnence in the Constitution, however, the establishment
clause drew little note in the Supreme Court for more than 150 years. The clause emerged
from obscurity only in 1947 in the senunal case of Everson v. Board of Education." Conkle,
Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw U.L. Rnv 1113, 1124 (1988)
(footnotes omitted).
46. For the text of the Lemon test, see infra text accompanying note 51. For a discussion
of the standard of review exercised by appellate courts in reviewing establishment clause cases,
see infra text accompanying notes 61-65. For an extended discussion of the Lemon test as
applied to the facts of Clayton by Clayton v. Place, 690 F Supp. 850 (W.D. Mo. 1988),
rev'd, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), reh'g en banc denied, 889 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990), see infra notes 61-218 and accompanying text.
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the Court's first major attempt to expound an approach to establishment
clause cases in Everson v. Board of Education.47 Justice Black's majority
opinion in Everson established the foundation for the Court's current
establishment clause approach. Black stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least tls: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
im to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious orgamzations or groups and vice versa."4
The prnciple of Black's pronouncement has been restated by the Court in
many ways 4 9 but the scheme most often used by the Court was developed
in Lemon v. Kurtzman.50 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in
Lemon, explained the Court's tripartite approach:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the
cumulative critena developed by the Court over many years. Three such
tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its pnncipal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." 5'
47. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Blackmun described the Lemon test as an attempt to "refine
[the Everson] pnnciples." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3100 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
48. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. Black's statement of the establishment clause makes clear
that the establishment clause applies to both the state and federal governments. Everson
expressly "incorporated" against the states the establishment clause through the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause. Id. at 15. Thus, the School Board's status as a local
governmental unit has no impact on the application of establishment clause methodology in
this case.
49. For example, Justice Fortas stated:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters
of religious theory, doctnne, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion
or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one
religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite.
The First Amendment mandates government neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
50. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The use of the Lemon test has been repeated in so many
establishment clause opinions that even the news media has recognized that "[s]ince 1971 the
Court has relied on the Lemon test " Bates, Ignore a Menorah, NEw RPuraLic, July
31, 1989, at 14, 15.
51. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613 (citations omitted). Burger commented that the Lemon
inquiry was developed "with reference to the three main evils against which the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involve-
ment of the sovereign ' Id. at 612 (quoting Wakz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668
(1970)). Line-drawing on the basis of these evils was necessitated by "the absence of precisely
stated constitutional prohibitions " Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
1990]
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If the government practice in a given case is found to be inconsistent with
any of the three inquiries, the Court will find that practice unconstitutional. 52
However, analysis under the Lemon test is hardly straightforward. The
Lemon inquiries are only the beginmng of any establishment clause adju-
dication.53 The Lemon Court candidly admitted that "the line of separation,
far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier
depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship. '54 Deter-
mimng where the "variable barrier" lies in a particular case requires careful
line-drawing.5 5 The difficulty of this line-drawing led the Court in Hunt v
McNar5 6 to describe the test as "no more than [a] helpful signpost[]. 57
A look at some of the Court's decisions applying the Lemon test makes
even the "helpful signpost" characterization appear charitable.58 However,
the Court has muddled through these difficulties in the context of education,
where it has consistently applied the Lemon test to invalidate governmental
actions. 9
52. "If a statute violates any of these three principles [of the Lemon test], it must be
struck down under the Establishment Clause." Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
53. The Lemon inquiries "must not be viewed as setting the precise limits to the necessary
constitutional inquiry, but serve only as guidelines with which to identify instances in which
the objectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired." Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 359 (1975).
54. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
55. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984).
In each case, the inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be
framed. The Establishment Clause like the Due Process Clauses is not a precise,
detailed provision in a legal code capable of ready application. The purpose of
the Establishment Clause "was to state an objective, not to write a statute."
The line between permissible relationships and those barred by the Clause can
no more be straight and unwavering than due process can be defined in a single
stroke or phrase or test.
Id. (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 669).
56. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
57 Id. at 741.
58. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983). This is particularly true in the
context of state aid to religious schools, as the Court itself has admitted. "It is not at all
easy, however, to apply this Court's various decisions construing the Clause to governmental
programs of financial assistance to sectarian schools and the parents of children attending
those schools." Id.
59. The Court has observed that it has "particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving
the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the education of our children."
School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985). More specifically:
Using the Everson doctrine and the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has
invalidated numerous government practices, many of them relating to public and
private education. The Court has prohibited spoken group prayer and Bible
reading in the public schools, it has invalidated a statute authorizing a moment
of silent prayer at the opening of the school day, and it has refused to permit
the states to mandate the teaching of "creation-science" theory alongside the
theory of evolution. At the same time, the Court has made it extremely difficult
for states to provide financial aid to parochial schools, striking down numerous
legislative efforts to support these educational programs.
Conkle, supra note 45, at 1125-26.
[Vol. 66:315
DANCING IN THE DARK
The Court's recent cases reaffirm the Lemon test's continuing vitality in
the face of a strong frontal attack from the conservative branch of the
Court.6 While the Lemon test is the most appropriate framework for
analyzing the errors of the Eighth Circuit's Clayton panel decision, this
Note will also apply establishment clause inquiries that were developed to
supplement or supplant at least one of the Lemon test prongs.
60. The roots of the attack on the Lemon test are probably traceable to Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985).
Rehnquist argued that the Court's establishment clause methodology had been built "upon
a mistaken understanding of constitutional history," id. at 92, namely that Madison "saw the
Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion He did not
see it as requiring neutrality on the part of government between religion and irreligion." Id.
at 98. After a long exegesis attempting to prove this historical point, Rehnquist proceeded to
attack each prong of the Lemon test as inconsistent with his historical interpretation. Id. at
108-11. However, no Justice joined Rehnquist's dissent. (Justice White stated that he "appre-
ciate[d] Justice Rehnquist's explication of the history of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment." Id. at 91 (White, J., dissenting)).
However, new members of the Court have allied themselves with Rehnquist. To date, Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy have individually written dissents attacking each of the three
inquiries that comprise the Lemon test. For example, Rehnquist took issue with the "excessive
entanglement" prong of the Lemon test in his dissent in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420-
21 (1985). Rehnquist argued that the prohibition against excessive entanglement created a
"catch-22" "[A]id must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the supervision itself is
held to cause an entanglement." Id. at 421. The purpose prong was the chosen target of
Justice Scalia's dissent in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610-40 (1987). Scalia argued
strenuously against the continued use of the "purpose" prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 636-
40. He was not at all shy in suggesting that "[a]bandomng Lemon's purpose test would
be a good place to start [developing clarity and predictability in establishment clause litigation]."
Id. at 640. A similar attack is contained in Justice Kennedy's dissent in Allegheny, 109 S. Ct.
at 3134-46 (joined by Rehnquist, Scalia and White). Kennedy argued that the effects (or
"endorsement") prong of the Lemon test should be abandoned in favor of a test invalidating
only governmental action that is coercive. Id. at 3134-35.
Despite the venomousness of these attacks, a majority of the Court has thus far clung
steadfastly to the Lemon test. The Court's most recent pronouncement on the establishment
clause, Allegheny, illustrates this point. Allegheny concerned the constitutionality of two
holiday displays in the City of Pittsburgh. While the Court could muster only a plurality on
the constitutionality of the two displays, a strong majority of five reaffirmed their faith in
the Lemon test. Both Blackmun's opinion delivering the judgment of the Court, 1d. at 3105-
11, and O'Connor's partial concurrence, id. at 3119-22, contain strongly worded refutations
of Kennedy's dissent.
However, Justice Brennan's resignation may revitalize the attempt by Rehnquist's wing of
the Court to abandon the Lemon test. Oliver S. Thomas, the general counsel of the Baptist
Joint Committee on Public Affairs, observed prior to Brennan's resignation that "[w]ith
another appointment, we may see some radical reconstructive surgery on the establishment
clause." Bates, supra note 50, at 14. It remains to be seen whether Justice David Souter,
President Bush's new appointee replacing Brennan on the Court, is the radical surgeon
envisioned by Mr. Thomas. However, if Souter's record as New Hampshire's Attorney General
is any indication, the days of the Lemon test may be numbered. See Washington Post, Sept.
10, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 3, 5-6 ("As appointed attorney general under conservative Gov.
Meldnm Thomson Jr., Souter defended ordering state flags lowered to half-staff on Good
Friday to commemorate the death of Jesus .").
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III. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis in Clayton with a statement of the
proper standard of review The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require
that "[flindings of fact . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
of the credibility of the witnesses."161 The Supreme Court has said that the
"clearly erroneous" standard "does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse
the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would
have decided the case differently." 62 This command is particularly clear
when credibility determinations are at issue. 63
The Eighth Circuit's panel opinion attempted to distinguish Clayton by
arguing that "[tihe ultimate conclusion of the [Purdy no-dancing] rule's
constitutionality is a mixed question of law and fact.'' 64 Review under
a "mixed question of law and fact" standard means that the reviewing
court is free to reconsider the conclusions of law applied to the findings of
fact. This "mixed question" characterization, however, does not, as the
Eighth Circuit panel apparently believed, give the reviewing court a free
hand to overturn the findings of fact upon which the district court based
its conclusions of law 65 These basic standard of review principles and the
proper deference that should be accorded to a district court's findings of
fact underlie the analysis in this portion of the Note.
61. FED. R. Crv P 52(a).
62. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
63. Id. at 575.
When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of wit-
nesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial court's findings;
for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of
voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what
is said. [T]hat finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be
clear error.
Id.
64. Clayton by Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1989), rev'g, 690 F Supp.
850 (W.D. Mo. 1988), reh'g en banc denied, 889 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1811 (1990). The Clayton court based this conclusion on another Eighth Circuit opinion,
Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988). Clayton, 884 F.2d at 378.
The Carter court derived the "mixed question of fact and law" standard of review "from a
close reading of the methodology used by the majority in [Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1983)]." Carter, 857 F.2d at 453.
65. An example of this distinction is found in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch:
But whether a government activity communicates endorsement of religion is not
a question of simple historical fact. Although evidentiary submissions may help
answer it, the question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based classifi-
cations commumcate an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be
answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693-94. Under O'Connor's standard, a reviewing court could not overturn
a finding of fact that a government practice historically communicates endorsement of religion.
What the court can do is find an historical fact to be an insufficient basis for forming a legal
conclusion that the government action is barred by the Lemon test.
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A. The "'Purpose" Prong of the Lemon Test
The first inquiry identified by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman6 is that
"the statute must have a secular legislative purpose." 67 "In applying the
purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether government's actual purpose
is to endorse or disapprove of religion."' 6 To be invalidated under the
Lemon test, the legislature's action must be "entirely motivated by a purpose
to advance religion." 69 Therefore, a law motivated by religious purpose may
be found constitutional if it also has a secular purpose. This does not mean
that every asserted secular justification will be accepted by the Court at
face value. To the contrary, the Court has on several occasions invalidated
government actions under the purpose prong despite asserted secular justi-
fications from the governmental actor. On those occasions, the Court
invoked the "sham purpose" doctrine .70Where no legitimate secular purpose
can be found, the government action is unconstitutional and further inquiry
under the remaimng prongs of the Lemon test becomes unnecessary.71
One of the most ambiguous elements of the Lemon test is the standard
for determimng when there is an absence of secular purpose. Justice
O'Connor has suggested that the Court utilize a fully informed "objective
observer" standard.7 2 Although this standard is made explicit in only a
single O'Connor concurrence, it has been argued that "It]he Court itself
has interpreted the secular purpose requirement in much this way."73
As a consequence of the Court's refinements, application of the purpose
prong of the Lemon test has become slippery However, the purpose prong
is useful in an establishment clause inquiry even where a secular purpose
has been found. Professor Tribe observed in his review of the Court's
establishment clause cases that "[w]here a law partly advances religion..
the [objective] observer would view a non-secular legislative motivation as
additional, helpful evidence of an establishment clause violation." 74 This
66. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
67. Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
68. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 690) (O'Connor, J., concurrng).
69. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (emphasis added).
70. For extensive discussion of the sham purpose doctrine, see infra notes 102-35 and
accompanying text.
71. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56. "[No consideration of the second or third criteria is necessary
if a statute does not have a clearly secular purpose." Id.
72. "The relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement "
Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This approach has been described as "a helpful
formulation" by at least one commentator. L. TRmE, AMERICAN CoNsTrr=rNoAL LAW § 14-
9, at 1205 (2d ed. 1988).
73. L. TRIE, supra note 72, § 14-9, at 1205. For a full explanation of Tribe's assertion,
see id. § 14-9, at 1205-06.
74. Id. § 14-9, at 1212-13.
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evidence could then be used to aid analysis under the effects prong of the
Lemon test.
75
1. The Purpose Prong of the Lemon Test and
Clayton by Clayton v. Place
The district court in Clayton held that the School Board's refusal to
withdraw its ban on dancing violated the purpose prong of the Lemon
test.76 The court based this holding on an extensive series of credibility
determinations based on the testimony of several witnesses.7 7 These credi-
bility determinations, coupled with the history of the no-dancing rule in
Purdy and the Board's reaction to the parents' attempt to rent the school
for purposes of holding a dance, led the district court to conclude that
"[t]he excessive caution surrounding anything connected with dancing un-
dermines any assertion of a secular purpose Y)78
Despite the district court's thorough findings of fact and well-reasoned
holdings, the Eighth Circuit's panel opimon found the Purdy School Board's
refusal to allow dancing to have been motivated by a secular purpose. The
panel offered three reasons for its reversal of the district court.
First, the panel focused on the absence of actual record evidence of an
improper purpose in the passage of Rule 502.29 79 Yet the panel itself
virtually admitted that analysis of the Rule's original purpose was impossible
75. For an extensive discussion of the effects prong of the Lemon test, see infra notes 136-
209 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor has stated that "the Lemon inquiry into the
effect of an enactment would help decide those close cases where the validity of an expressed
secular purpose is in doubt." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurnng). Tribe has
identified at least two ways in which the evidence of religious motivation can be utilized under
the effects prong in O'Connor's "close cases"-
When a statute is based on a publicly broadcast religious purpose, those who
are charged with enforcing it may infer that religious effects in application are
permitted, encouraged, or even mandated. In addition, when a religious moti-
vation combines with religious effects, the result is to put the voice and the
power of government behind religion in a way that religious motivation alone
does not.
L. TRINE, supra note 72, § 14-9, at 1213-14.
76. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 854-55.
77 The court briefly summarized its credibility determinations:
The Court regards the following statements of the board members as unper-
suasive; that no one has ever stated to them that they oppose dancing in the
schools for religious reasons; that they have no idea why the community is
opposed to dancing in the school; that there was no religious pressure to keep
the rule; and that the rental policy was changed in response to problems with
liability of the school. This Court is skeptical that it heard the complete
story concerning the board members' deliberations of the rule and the religious
significance of the opposition to dancing in Purdy.
Id. at 854-55. The court also specified which witnesses and testimony it disbelieved. Id.
78. Id. at 856.
79. Clayton, 884 F.2d at 379.
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when it stated that "[alithough the record does not indicate when the rule
was enacted, the parties agree it has been in place for a long time." 80
Because no one remembered when the Rule was enacted, it is unlikely that
anyone remembers the legislative purpose of the Rule's enactment. Further-
more, the Supreme Court has made clear that the absence of a legislative
purpose in the record does not affect a purpose prong inquiry.8' Although
the panel may have been technically correct in stating that "[t]he district
court's opimon does not rest on any adverse factual findings bearing directly
on the content of rule 502.29 or on the circumstances surrounding its
original passage," 82 the panel did not indicate why this fact is relevant for
the reviewing court.
The district court focused its purpose prong inquiry on the actions of
those governmental actors who were asked to repeal the rule. 3 That focus
resulted in findings of fact entitled to deference by a reviewing court under
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.8 Despite the clear mandates of both Rule 52(a) and existing
Eighth Circuit precedent,85 the panel disregarded the district court's findings
without citing any precedent for its conclusion that the district court's focus
was erroneous. 6
80. Id. at 377.
81. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395-96 n.4 (1983).
Section 290.09 [a Minnesota law allowing state taxpayers to deduct expenses
related to sending their children to a pnvate school] contains no express statements
of legislative purpose, and its legislative history offers few unamibiguous indi-
cations of actual intent. The absence of such evidence does not affect our
treatment of the statute.
Id. (emphasis added).
82. Clayton, 884 F.2d at 379.
83. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 855. "Although the intent of the decisionmakers who
promulgated the rule cannot be ascertained, the school board in keeping the rule abandoned
neutrality with the intent to promote a particular view in religious matters." Id. (emphasis
added).
84. For discussion of the standard of review issue, see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying
text.
85. An example of this precedent is Pratt v. Independent School Distnct No. 831, 670
F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982). That case involved the constitutionality of a decision to remove the
film The Lottery from the school's curriculum. In language strikingly similar to the case at
hand, the Pratt court observed that "[t]he district court found that the objections of the
board's majority had 'religious overtones' The district court's findings are not clearly
erroneous." Pratt, 670 F.2d at 776. For further discussion of Pratt, see infra notes 121-24
and accompanying text.
86. The panel must provide legal precedent to justify its disregard of the district court's
finding of fact. The absence of such precedent violates the panel's own characterization of
the establishment clause standard of review as a "mixed question of law and fact." See supra
notes 61-65 and accompanying text. This disrespect of the district court's findings of fact drew
the ire of the judges who dissented from the demal of a rehearing en banc: "The panel's
conclusions in applying the Lemon test fail to give proper consideration to the findings of the
district court " " Clayton, 889 F.2d at 193.
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Finally, that the School Board was being asked to repeal an existing rule,
as opposed to passing a new rule, is irrelevant. The retention of the Rule
by the Board is equivalent to a reenactment. The legislature may have a
different motive for passing a law each time that law is reconsidered in the
legislative process. The issue of retaining the Rule was debated as fully as
if a rule banning social dancing was being considered for the first tune.
The Eighth Circuit's reasoning on this point is at best artificial, since the
decision-making process is the object of establishment clause analysis, and
the effect on the students is the same whether the law is being passed for
the first time or merely being reenacted.17
The panel's second argument was that "plaintiffs conceded at oral ar-
gument (and the district court acknowledged) that extracurricular dancing
is a wholly secular activity.""8 Yet, as the judges dissenting from the denial
of a rehearing en banc observed, the issue in Clayton was not whether
dancing was a secular activity. Rather, "[tihe true issue in the case ... is
whether the 'no dance' rule has a secular purpose."8 9 Focusing on the
secular motivations behind the Rule instead of the activity governed by the
Rule is consistent with the Supreme Court's establishment clause cases. For
87 See infra notes 136-209 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of effect
prong analysis under the Lemon test.
88. Clayton, 884 F.2d at 379.
89. Clayton, 889 F.2d at 193 n.2 (Gibson, J., dissenting). It is important to note how the
district court framed the issue before it:
The issue before this Court is not (as defendants contend) whether the Purdy
School Distnct must sponsor social dances, nor is it the responsibility or prerog-
ative of this Court (as plaintiffs contend) to mandate how many, if any, or when
school dances are to be held. The issue is simply whether the rule which prohibits
school dances in the Purdy school system is an impermissible establishment of
religion.
Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 851. The court concluded its opimon by noting that "[i]t would be
inappropriate for this Court to order the distnct to sponsor school dances "' Id. at 857.
It is important to recogmze the limited scope of the district court's holding, because
characterizing that holding as creating a constitutional nght to dance misstates the function
of the establishment clause. The specific scope of this Note is whether the decision to disallow
dancing in this instance occurred in a process so infused with religion as to render that decision
a transgression of the establishment clause. This narrow, fact-based inquiry (as opposed to
the broad-sweeping characterization of a constitutional right to dance), is consistent with
Justice O'Connor's belief that "[e]very government practice must be judged in its unique
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion."
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court has followed this limited
inquiry in practice. The following passage from Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct.
890 (1989), is illustrative:
It is not our responsibility to specify which permssible secular objectives, if
any, the State should pursue to justify a tax exemption for religious periodicals.
That charge rests with the Texas legislature. Our task, and that of the Texas
courts, is rather to ensure that any scheme of exemptions adopted by the
legislature does not have the purpose or effect of sponsoring certain religious
tenets or religious belief in general.
Id. at 900.
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example, in Epperson v Arkansas9° the Court found unconstitutional a
state law prohibiting the teaching of evolution. The Court reached this
result although teaching evolution is a wholly secular activity 91
The panel concluded its criticism of the district court's- purpose prong
analysis by observing that "there is no record evidence of any actual religious
purpose connected with the rule's enactment or its textual requirements. In
our view, the rule on its face thus satisfies the first prong of the Lemon
analysis." ' 92 This sweeping statement completely ignores the credibility judg-
ments made by the district court as well as the testimony of several witnesses
who recounted instances of religious motivation. The panel gave no reason,
precedential or otherwise, why the credibility determinations and other non-
record evidence so copiously detailed by the district court do not serve as
an effective substitute for the absence of record evidence. In fact, the
Supreme Court has made clear that the absence of record evidence "does
not affect our treatment of the statute. ' 93 If record evidence is the only
measure of religious purpose, then the purpose prong can be "circumvented
by merely omitting from a rule any explicit statement of religious purpose." '94
The Court has adopted a broader range of acceptable evidence to avoid
this easy method of circumvention. 9
The panel cited Wallace v. Jaffree9 as an example of good record evidence
of religious motivation.97 The panel pointed to the following passage in
Wallace: "The sponsor of the bill ... inserted into the legislative record-
apparently without dissent-a statement indicating that the legislation was
an 'effort to return voluntary prayer' to the public schools." 9 However, a
careful reading of the remainder of Wallace reveals that only four members
of the Court accepted the record statements of the bill's sponsor as sufficient
by itself to prove improper purpose. 99 Rather than an exclusive focus on
90. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
91. Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (finding unconstitutional a Louisiana
law that forbade the teaching of evolution unless accompanied by the teaching of creation).
92. Clayton, 884 F.2d at 379 (citations omitted).
93. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396 n.4. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
94. Clayton, 889 F.2d at 193 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
95. For discussion of the types of proof allowed by the Court, see supra notes 66-70 and
accompanying text and infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
96. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
97. Clayton, 884 F.2d at 379.
98. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-57 (quoting Sen. Donald Holmes).
99. Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
and Powell joined. Powell filed a concurring opinion. O'Connor filed an opinion concurrng
in the judgment. Burger, White and Rehnquist each filed separate dissenting opinions. O'Con-
nor's concurrence stated that the record statements of a single legislator are not sufficient by
themselves to prove improper purpose. Id. at 77. Powell's concurrence stated that "[I] agree
with Justice O'Connor that a single legislator's statement is not necessarily sufficient to
establish purpose." Id. at 65. The dissenters were obviously not persuaded by the record
statements either. Thus, only four Justices felt the record focus was sufficient to prove a
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the record statements of a single legislator, the Court has used the "fully
informed objective person" standard to evaluate all evidence of religious
motivation, record and non-record alike.' °°
But even assuming that Wallace is a case evidencing strong religious
motivation, the evidence in Clayton is far more compelling. The Clayton
district court, rather than relying on the record statement of one of several
hundred legislators, based its decision on witness testimony and credibility
determinations attributing religious motivation to every member of the
School Board. Surely this is a firmer evidentiary basis than the record
evidence in Wallace.'0
2. The Secular Purpose Requirement of the Lemon Test
and the "Sham Purpose" Doctrine
The final problem with the panel's purpose prong analysis is that no
secular purpose was identified. Lemon requires that "the statute . have
a secular legislative purpose."' 0 2 Great deference is normally accorded "to
a State's articulation of a secular purpose, [but] it is required that the
statement of such purpose be sincere and not a sham."'' 3 Despite the
precedent for scrutinizing the validity of asserted secular purposes, the panel
acted as if the secular nature of the school district's purposes were obvious.'
4
The panel should have analyzed the asserted secular purposes under the
"sham purpose" doctrine.
There is no set standard for determining whether an asserted secular
purpose is a sham. 05 One helpful aspect of the Court's sham purpose
violation of the establishment clause under the purpose prong of the Lemon test. Rather, the
Court looked at a whole array of additional evidence in reaching its conclusion. "[A]s noted
in the Court's opinion, the religious purpose is manifested in other evidence, including
the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes." Id. at 65 (Powell, J., concurring).
100. For a discussion of the objective person standard, see supra notes 72-73 and accom-
panying text.
i01. That conclusion sets aside, for the moment, the additional histoncal evidence relied
upon by the Wallace Court. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
102. Lemon, 408 U.S. at 612.
103. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-87. Justice O'Connor recognized that "[i]t is of course
possible that a legislature will enunciate a sham secular purpose for a statute." Wallace, 472
U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurrng).
104. Admittedly, a statute is not required to contain the secular purpose in its text or on
record. "Even if the text and official history of a statute express no secular purpose, the
statute should be held to have an improper purpose only if it is beyond purview that
endorsement of religion or a religious belief 'was and is the law's reason for existence."'
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 108 (1968)). This Note contends that, absent the endorsement of the religious beliefs of
the majority of the citizens of the town of Purdy, the dance ban would not exist.
105. Justice O'Connor recognized this fact, but defended the sham purpose doctrine by
stating that "[I] have little doubt that our courts are capable of distinguishing a sham secular
purpose from a sincere one " Id. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The sham purpose
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analysis is that much less deference is given to post hoc secular purpose
rationalizations. 106 Some examples of the Court's application of the sham
purpose doctnne are instructive.
In School District of Abington v Schempp,1 07 the Court was confronted
with the constitutionality of a public school distnct policy requiring the
daily recitation of Bible verses and the Lord's Prayer. The Court found the
requirement unconstitutional despite the asserted secular purposes of "pro-
motion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our
times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature."'' 08
The Court felt that the provision allowing alternative use of the Catholic
Douay version of the Bible in lieu of the King James version belied the
asserted secular purposes. 9
In Stone v. Graham, "0 the Court invalidated a Kentucky law that required
public schools to post the Ten Commandments in every classroom. Kentucky
attempted to fashion a secular purpose by requinng that the following
caption be emblazoned in small print at the bottom of each display: "'The
secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption
as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common
Law of the United States."'' The Court rejected this proffered secular
purpose, arguing that "[t]he pre-emment purpose for posting the Ten
Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature. . . [N]o
legislative recitation . can blind us to that fact."" 2
The Court invoked the sham purpose doctrine against a post hoc assertion
of secular purpose in Wallace,1' 3 which involved an Alabama statute re-
quiring a one minute moment of silence in all public schools for "meditation
or voluntary prayer.'' 4 While "[t]he State did not present evidence of any
secular purpose""' 5 during the passage of the bill, it was argued on appeal
that the moment of silence was an attempt to accommodate the free exercise
rights of the state's public school students. 1 6 The Court rejected this asserted
inquiry is thus similar to Justice Stewart's "I know it when I see it" standard for determining
whether something is obscene. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurrng); see Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and Estab-
lishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv 495 (1986).
106. "The Court has previously found the postenactment elucidation of the meaning of a
statute to be of little relevance in determining the intent of the legislature contemporaneous
to the passage of the statute." Edwards, 482 U.S. at 596 n.19 (Powell, J., concurring).
107. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
108. Id. at 223.
109. Id. at 224.
110. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per cunam).
i11. Id. at 41 (citation omitted) (quoting Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (Baldwin 1980)).
112. Id.
113. 472 U.S. at 38.
114. Id. at 40.
115. Id. at 57 (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at 57-58 n.45.
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justification because a pre-existing statute that authorized a moment of
silence for "meditation" "already protected that [free exercise] right, con-
taming nothing that prevented any student from engaging in voluntary
prayer during a silent minute of meditation. Appellants have not identified
any secular purpose that was not fully served before the enact-
ment. 1117
A further example is Edwards v Aguillard,"' where the Court held
unconstitutional a Louisiana law that prohibited the teaching of evolution
in public schools unless creatiomsm was also taught. The avowed secular
purpose of the statute was to protect academic freedom."19 However, the
Court argued that "requiring schools to teach creation science with evolution
does not advance academic freedom. The Act does not grant teachers a
flexibility that they did not already possess. . Indeed, the Court of
Appeals found that no law prohibited Louisiana public school teachers from
teaching any scientific theory."' 20 The Court thus found the secular purpose
to be a pretext for the true religious motivation of the legislature.
Even if one were to conclude that the above precedents were an insufficient
basis for the panel to have applied the sham purpose doctrine, there was
precedential supp6rt for applying the sham purpose doctrine within the
Eighth Circuit itself. Pratt v Independent School District Number 831 12
involved the constitutionality of the school board's decision to ban the
showing of the film The Lottery There was substantial evidence that the
School Board acted with "religious overtones."' 12 However, the Board, in
its rationale to the district court, claimed that the film was removed due to
excessive violence. 2 Excessive violence would appear to be a more com-
pelling secular justification than those'justifications presented by the Purdy
School Board. Nonetheless, in Pratt, the Eighth Circuit rejected this ration-
ale because 'the self-serving statements of the school board, made after
the fact and not based on the previous record .. are untenable in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made. ' 2
4
In the above examples, the reviewing court, before commencing a sham
purpose inquiry, seemed convinced that there was strong religious motiva-
tion. In Clayton, the evidence showed a religious motivation. The next step
117 Id. at 59 (footnote omitted).
118. 482 U.S. at 578.
119. Id. at 586.
120. Id. at 587.
121. 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982). For additional discussion of the circumstances surrounding
this case, see supra note 85.
122. Id. at 776. Additional similarity to the facts in Clayton exist, such as the fact that
"[p]arents and citizens sought to have the films removed largely on the basis of the purported
negative impact the material would have on the religious and family values of students." Id.
at 778.
123. Id. at 779.
124. Id. at 778 (quoting the unpublished opimon of the district court).
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should have been to analyze the secular purposes asserted by the Purdy
School Board under the sham purpose doctrine. The Eighth Circuit panel
did not even make a pretense of undertaking a sham purpose analysis.
The asserted secular justifications in Clayton appear to be that allowing
dancing would be costly and would increase the responsibility of teachers.7
The district court found several reasons why these asserted secular purposes
were shams. First, the court found it "unbelievable that 300-400 people
came to the school board meeting to protest the added expense of 1 or 2
dances or the increased responsibility to teachers."'26 Instead, the court
found the large turnout to be evidence that "[t]he school board adopted
the reasoning of the 'majority' of townspeople, including the strongly-held
religious views."' 2 7 Second, the court was skeptical that the dance ban
actually achieved the asserted secular purposes. The school already sponsored
banquets instead of dances, 12 and the teachers already had chaperoning
responsibilities at those banquets. 129 The district court concluded its purpose
prong analysis with the following remarks:
It is particularly significant that no facts were requested of the opponents
of the rule to ascertain whether there would be any increased costs or
responsibilities. The record is devoid of any indication that the board
investigated the reasons propounded by the opponents, despite the fact
that the school's superintendent favored rescinding the rule and stated
that he could handle any chaperoning problems.130
The school district's asserted secular justifications thus appear very similar
to those in Wallace and Edwards in the sense that pre-existing legislation
already protected the interests that were assertedly the object of the gov-
ernment action.''
The school district concocted another justification for its refusal to rent
the school to parents who wished to sponsor a dance for their children.
The School Board claimed that it ended its general rental policy because of
liability problems, although it continued to allow its facilities to be used
for other activities such as a donkey, basketball game. 132 The judges who
125. It is unclear from the record in the Clayton case whether the Board really offered
these justifications, and if they did, whether they were of the post hoc variety.
126. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 855.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
129. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 855.
130. Id.
131. In the case at hand, the asserted interests are not protected by either a no-dance or
pro-dance policy. Teacher responsibilities and costs would not increase, but only shift to a
different activity. If the district was truly interested in reducing costs and teacher responsibilities,
it would not sponsor the banquet. In light of this fact, the district court's opimon bears
repeating: "The excessive caution surrounding anything connected with dancing undermines
any assertion of a secular purpose " Id. at 856.
132. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 854.
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dissented from the demal of a rehearing correctly noted that "[t]he record
does not reveal why dancing poses greater liability problems than does
donkey basketball."'' 3 The lack of congruence between the Board's refusal
to rent the gym for dancing and its asserted secular aim of decreasing
liability exposure gives credence to the district court's conclusion that "the
reasons propounded by the majority were a mere pretext for the real religious
reasomng." 3 4
In summary, the trial court concluded that School Board members, in
their voting, were directly influenced by their own religious beliefs and those
of the citizens of Purdy; that the sequence and timing of events supIorted
the motives attributed by the trial court in its credibility judgments; and
that the School Board's inability to explain how its actions would effectuate
its asserted secular purposes confirmed the conclusion that those purposes
were shams.
Even though the absence of a secular purpose is by itself a sufficient
basis for invalidating Rule 502.29,131 this Note will analyze Purdy R-2 School
District Rule 502.29 under the remaining prongs of the Lemon inquiry
B. The "'Effect" Prong of the Lemon Test
The second inquiry developed by the Lemon Court requires that a statute's
"principal or primary effect . be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion."' 36 Any nonsecular effect must be "indirect, remote and inciden-
tal." 137 The Court has recharacterized the "effect" test as an inquiry into
whether government practices "have the effect of commumcating a message
of government endorsement or disapproval of religion." 13 This Note focuses
133. Clayton, 889 F.2d at 195 n.6 (Gibson, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying
notes 35-36.
134. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 855.
135. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
136. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
137 Tribe has argued:
The constitutional requirement of "primary secular effect" has thus become a
misnomer; while retaimng the earlier label, the Court has transformed it into a
requirement that any non-secular effect be remote, indirect and mcidental. This
shift is analytically significant, for the remote-indirect-and-incidental standard
plainly compels a more searching inquiry, and comes closer to the absolutist no-
aid approach to the establishment clause than the primary effect test did. In
practice, however, the formulation has not always resulted in a particularly
searching inquiry, and a number of forms of aid have survived.
L. TRiE, supra note 72, § 14-10, at 1215-16 (emphasis in original).
138. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also School Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1985) (citations omitted) (where a law "conveys a
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the
Establishment Clause is violated."); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3100
(1989) (Blackmun, J.) ("In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether
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on the appearance of government endorsement.139
There are several ways government endorsement of religion can occur,
the most obvious of which is governmental attempts to indoctrinate the
public in the views of a particular faith. 140 A more subtle case occurs when
government "fosters a close identification of its powers and responsibilities
with those of any-or all-religious denominations. 141 A governmental
action may be found unconstitutional if
the symbolic umon of church and state effected by the challenged
governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents.
of the controlling denominations as an endorsement,- and by the nona-
dherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices. The
inquiry into this kind of effect must be conducted with particular care
when many of the citizens perceiving the governmental message are
children in their formative years.'4 2
the challenged government practice either has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion, a
concern that has long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.") (quoting Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962)).
For a discussion df the definition of "endorsement," see Blackmun's opinion in Allegheny,
109 S. Ct. at 3100-01 (arguing that "[wihether the key word is 'endorsement,' 'favoritism,'
or 'promotion,' the essential principle remains the same.").
An important part of the endorsement inquiry is deternming whether the government action
makes nonadherents feel that they are 'not full members of the political community."'
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688). For an
extensive discussion of the communitarian perspective as applied to the establishment clause,
see infra notes 171-92 and accompanying text.
139. There is no assertion in Clayton that allowing dancing would be perceived by the
townspeople as an official governmental disapproval of religion. The School Board would not
be disapproving the beliefs of the members of the Ministerial Alliance if it allowed dancing.
Rather, it would be expressing a respect for those views by not coercing those opposed to
dancing to participate. The government would thus be acting in a neutral manner-neither
approving nor disapproving of the community's religious beliefs.
All government action would violate the establishment clause if government is seen as
disapproving religion by allowing secular activities disapproved of by religious groups to go
forward, especially when the activity involved would not require participation by those who
disapprove of the disputed activity on religious grounds.
140. See, e.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 385 ("[T]he Clause does absolutely
prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a
particular religious faith."); Stone, 449 U.S. at 42 ("If the posted copies of the Ten
Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read,
meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments. However desirable this
might be as a matter of private devotion, it is not a permissible state objective under the
Establishment Clause."); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1983) ("[IThe
State is constitutionally compelled to assure that the state-supported activity is not being used
for religious indoctrination."); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 ("The State must be certain, given
the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion ").
Even the four Justices desirous of abandoning the Lemon test would find government
sponsored indoctrination to be a violation of the establishment clause. See supra note 60 and
accompanying text and infra notes 194-209 and accompanying text.
141. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 389; see also Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982) ("ITlhe mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative
authority by Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds
of some by reason of the power conferred.").
142. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 390.
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The district court in Clayton found such a symbolic union to exist in
Purdy 43 On review, the panel failed to take the "particular care" that the
Court has required when children are involved. t4
There are several approaches to determining whether the threshold of
government endorsement has been overstepped in Purdy. This Note will
analyze Clayton under each of the threshold approaches to the effects prong
of the Lemon test.
1. Effect Prong Analysis Under the Separability
and Breadth Inquiries
Under one approach to the threshold problem of the effect inquiry, the
Court has developed a two-step inquiry: "[T]he Court has asked whether
the secular impact is sufficiently separable from the religious, and whether
the class benefited is sufficiently broad. ' 41
By requiring that a law's secular impact be clearly separable from its
religious impact, the Court is seeking to ensure that the decision-making
process appears free of any appearance of establishment clause impropn-
ety '4 Laws prohibiting murder are the most obvious examples of existing
statutes that meet the separability requirement.1 47 Despite the existence of
biblical prohibitions against murder, 14 society clearly recognizes a purpose
143. "[Ihe primary effect of this rule is to endorse the tenets of that particular religious
group in Purdy who believes that social dancing is sinful." Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 855.
144. The district court in Clayton made specific mention of the special care it was taking
in light of the involvement of young children as the primary audience receiving the message
of religious control of the government. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 856 ("The inquiry into this
kind of effect must be conducted with particular care when many of the citizens perceiving
the governmental message are children of formative years.").
145. L. Tima, supra note 72, § 14-10, at 1216 (emphasis in original).
146. "[Sleparability's most important aspect is the subjective understanding of the individuals
affected, particularly school children, as to endorsement " Id. § 14-10, at 1224 (emphasis
added); see also Conkle, supra note 45, at 1172-74 (emphasis in original) ("Because we are
attempting to protect these individuals from an injury that is essentially psychological, we are
concerned with their perceptions ").
This subjective approach is consistent with the Court's position that "[flocus exclusively on
the religious component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the
Establishment Clause." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680. The separability requirement ensures that
there is a distinctly secular motive available so as to avoid the need to focus exclusively on
the religious component.
147. Consider also the prohibition against stealing: "That the Judaeo-Chrstian religions
oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the Federal Government may not, consistent
with the Establishment Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny." Hams v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 319 (1980).
148. "Laws against murder overlap the fifth commandment of the Mosaic Decalogue."
L. TiaE, supra note 72, § 14-9, at 1205.
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to preventing murder beyond the simple religious command "Thou shalt
not kill."' 49
There are several circumstances where a statute's secular component is
inseparable from its religious component. One such example is School
District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 150 which involved the constitutionality of
a school district program that provided classes to private school students at
public expense. The classes were conducted in space located in and leased
from the private schools. The Court found the program unconstitutional
because "[iun this environment [shuffling back and forth between private
school and public school classes], the students would be unlikely to discern
the crucial difference between the religious school classes and the 'public
school' classes, even if the latter were successfully kept free of religious
indoctrination.'"s'
The facts of Clayton by Clayton v. Place similarly fail to demonstrate a
separable secular effect. It is important to remember that the separability
analysis is conducted on a subjective basis; i.e. the ability of those actually
affected by the government action to divine a separable secular effect will
be determinative. 52 Given the events surrounding the deliberation of the
dance issue,"' the students of the Purdy schools cannot realistically be
expected to separate a secular effect.' 4
149. Exodus 20:13. One example of a secular purpose for murder laws is the natural law/
economic concerns written about by the philosopher John Locke. See Note, Substantive Due
Process Analysts and the Lockean Liberal Tradition: Rethinking the Modern Privacy Cases,
65 IND. L.J. 723, 739-40 (1990).
150. 473 U.S. at 373.
151. Id. at 391; cf. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952). McCollum and Zorach both involved voluntary part-time religious
instruction of public school students. However, the plan at issue in McCollum provided for
the instruction to occur on school premises, whereas the instruction in Zorach was conducted
outside school premises. The McCollum Court declared the on-site instruction unconstitutional,
while the Zorach Court found no constitutional infirmity for privately financed instruction off
public school grounds. The School Dist. of Grand Rapids Court, clearly utilizing separability
analysis, explained:
The difference in symboliC impact helps to explain the difference between the
cases. The symbolic connection of church and state in the McCollum program
presented the students with a graphic symbol of the "concert or umon or
dependency" of church and state. This very symbolic umon was conspicuously
absent in the Zorach program.
School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 391 (citation omitted) (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S.
at 312); see also Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 761 (1976) (quoting Roemer
v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F Supp. 1282, 1288 (D. Md. 1974)) (upholding a statute giving
state funds to any college or umversity in the state, including those with religious affiliations,
that met certain criteria because the religious schools performed 'essentially secular educational
functions' ").
152. "The question, therefore, is 'what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose'
of the no-dancing rule." Clayton, 889 F.2d at 196 (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lynch, 465
U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J.,, concurring)); see also supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text
and infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 7-32 and accompanying text.
154. The Clayton dissent emphasized the importance of Rule 502.29's context:
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Most of the students in Purdy were directly aware of the religious
opposition to dancing. The district court's record makes it abundantly clear
that a majority of the town's parents teach their children that social dancing
is a sin. 55 And if the children did not get that teaching at home, a good
portion of the district's students were probably in church when religious
opposition to social dancing was openly discussed.156 The budgetary justi-
fications were not even discussed until the case reached the district court, 5 7
and they would seem trivial to the student compared to the religious furor
that infused the dancing debate.
The Eighth Circuit's panel opinion rejected the district court's effect
prong conclusions because "[n]o student is prohibited from engaging in or
refraining from extracurricular dancing should they choose to do so. Any
arguably religious effect of the rule is indirect, remote, and incidental."'58
The panel reached this conclusion by mischaracterizing the Supreme Court's
effect prong inquiry, by failing to engage in a separability analysis, and by
providing absolutely no explanation for the conclusion that the effect is
"indirect, remote, and incidental."'15 9
The effect prong of the Lemon test does not require government to coerce
abstention from privately sponsored activity in order to transgress the
establishment clause.iw0 Rather, the effects prong "precludes] government
from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.' 'i6i The fact that Purdy
In Purdy, Missouri, the no-dancing rule differs little from a school's posting of
the Ten Commandments on its classroom walls. The panel implies that a
difference lies in the fact the Ten Commandments are religious on their face
whereas the no-dancing rule is facially non-religious. This distinction, however,
fails to give due regard to the religious environment that provides the no-dancing
rule its lifeblood: a small town in which five churches wielding political influence
teach that social dancing is sinful. Only in this context can the effect of the rule
be judged.
Clayton, 889 F.2d at 196 (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
155. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
158. Clayton, 884 F.2d at 379.
159. See supra note 137 The panel's opimon falls to undertake the more searching inquiry
that the Court's shift from the "primary secular effect" standard requires. The panel opinion
suffers from an inability to imagine the rather obvious non-secular effects of the "Alliance"
dominated decision-making process.
160. The Clayton dissent stated:
The message is not diluted, as the panel opimon suggests, by the fact that the
school does not coerce students into refraining from dance away from school
grounds. The Supreme Court has clearly held that proof of coercion is not a
necessary element of any claim under the Establishment Clause.
Clayton, 889 F.2d at 196 (Lay, C.J., dissenting); see supra note 56 (discussing Kennedy's
dissent in Allegheny).
161. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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high school students are not prohibited from dancing away from school
grounds does nothing to mimnimze the fact that the School Board has
endorsed the religious beliefs of the community. The endorsement conveyed
by the School Board "is no less obvious than a monument anchored to the
schoolhouse lawn pronouncing 'THIS SCHOOL ADHERES TO THE BA-
SIC TENETS OF THE MINISTERIAL ALLIANCE CHURCHES." 1 62
Given that the endorsement inquiry receives special attention where the
impressionable minds of children are involved, it is difficult to imagine how
the secular effect of the no-dance rule is any more separable than was the
case in School District of Grand Rapids. 63
The other part of the Court's threshold inquiry concerns whether the
class benefited by the statute is sufficiently broad. The purpose of the
breadth probe is to serve both as an independent inquiry'" and as a
supplementary, more objective check on the subjective nature of the sepa-
rability inquiry. 65 Once again, society's murder laws provide an excellent
example. Murder laws benefit a class much broader than those whose
religious beliefs consider murder to be a biblical evil. All of society' benefits
by ensuring that people can feel secure. Such a broad class of beneficiaries
avoids the appearance of a government endorsement of any one religious
point of view because people who are opposed to murder for secular reasons
can point solely to those secular effects as justification for the statute
without looking hypocritical.
One of the Court's most recent pronouncements on the establishment
clause is an excellent example of its breadth analysis. In Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock,'6 the Court declared unconstitutional a tax exemption
granted to literature published or distributed by religious organizations that
"'consist wholly of writings sacred to a religious faith."" 67 The Court, in
distinguishing prior holdings, 61 stated:
162. Clayton, 889 F.2d at 196 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
163. See supra note 141-42 and accompanying text.
164. "[H]owever separable from religion the benefited aspect of an enterprise might be, the
government's policy is frequently unconstitutional unless religious enterprises are benefited no
more than, and only as part of, some much broader category." L. TamE, supra note 72, §
14-10, at 1221.
165. Tribe has argued that "the public consciousness certainly should not be allowed to
supplant the first amendment's pnnciples. It is here that the perspective of an objective
observer, able to step back from the conventional understanding of the majority and to
comprehend the viewpoint of the mnority, is particularly important." L. TRmE, supra note
72, § 14-10, at 1224-25.
166. 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989); see also Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (holding unconstitutional a New York tax relief program for private school students
because approximately 85% of the program's beneficiaries were students in parochial schools).
167. Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 894 (quoting TEx. TAx CoDE ANN. § 151.312 (Vrnon
1982)).
168. The Court specifically mentioned Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding
that a state umversity can constitutionally maintain an equal access policy to its facilities, even
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[W]e [have] emphasized that the benefits derived by religious organiza-
tions flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups as well. Indeed,
were those benefits confined to religious organizations, they could not
have appeared other than as state sponsorship of religion; if that were
so, we would not have hesitated to strike them down for lacking a
secular purpose and effect. 69
This statement seems to make clear that a large number of secular benefi-
ciaries will be required to pass the breadth analysis required by the effects
prong of the Lemon test.
There is no breadth of beneficiaries in Clayton. The only persons benefited
by the dance ban are those whose religious beliefs oppose dancing. Those
whose religious beliefs embrace social dancing receive no benefit from the
dance ban (there is no evidence that anyone favored the dance ban for
economic reasons) except the assurance that their children will not be
committing what the dance opponents believe to be a sin, a decidedly non-
secular benefit. Given the influence of the Ministerial Alliance in the
deliberation process, 70 it is difficult to see how those in favor of allowing
social dancing are beneficiaries of Rule 502.29.
2. Effect Prong Analysis Under the Community Approach 17'
Another approach the Court uses in its threshold inquiry under the effects
prong of the Lemon test concerns the extent to which "[e]ndorsement sends
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders, favored members of the political community ,172
where this means use by religious groups, because all student groups were potential beneficianes,
not just student religious groups); Mueller, 463 U.S. 388 (upholding a state law allowing
deduction for tuition, transportation, and nonreligious textbook expenses because nonsectarian
private schools also benefited); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding a tax
exemption granted to nonprofit organizations despite the fact that religious groups benefited
because a wide array of nonreligious, nonprofit organizations also benefited).
169. Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 897
170. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
171. For a discussion of the merits of the communmty approach to the effects prong of the
Lemon test, see Conkle, supra note 45, at 1161-71, 1176-79.
172. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Although developed by O'Connor
in her Lynch concurrence, the language expressing concern over the preservation of community
has been cited with approval in the Court's most recent establishment clause decisions. See,
e.g., Texas Monthly, 109 S. Ct. at 899-900 (alteration in original) (quoting Corporation of
Presiding Bishop v Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987)) (statute in question "cannot but 'conve[y]
a message of endorsement' to slighted members of the community"); Allegheny, 109 S. Ct.
at 3101 (Blackmun, J.) (quoting the community language from Lynch approvingly). Justice
Kennedy's Allegheny dissent somewhat bitterly noted that "[tihe majority invalidates display
of the creche, not because it disagrees with the interpretation of Lynch but because it
chooses to discard the reasoning of the Lynch majority opinion in favor of Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in that case." Id. at 3140 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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The "community" approach is a fairly recent invention; it thus has been
mentioned sparingly by the Court. However, Friedman v. Board of County
Commissioners 13 illustrates the potential direction the community inquiry
could take. Friedman concerned the validity of the seal displayed on the
county's police cars. The county seal contained a promnently displayed
cross with a Spanish motto that translated to "With This We Conquer."' 7 4
The Tenth Circuit declared the display of the seal unconstitutional due to
its belief that individuals stopped by a police car bearing the county seal
"could reasonably assume that the officers were Christian police, and that
the organization they represented identified itself with the Christian God.
A follower of any non-Christian religion might well question the officers'
ability to provide even-handed treatment."'' 75 The county seal failed the
effect prong analysis under the community approach because it did not
reach out to a cross-section of the community any broader than those
adhering to the Christian faith.
The Supreme Court has not adopted this view, but apparently finds there
is no effect on a nonadherent's feeling of exclusion from the community
when the government practices at issue, "although born of religion, had
with time lost their religious nature.' '176 This conclusion is compelled by the
anomalous results of Marsh v. Chambers77 and Lynch.78 Marsh involved
a challenge to the constitutionality of Nebraska's use of a chaplain to open
its legislative sessions. The Court found Nebraska's use of the chaplain
constitutional because "[t]he unbroken practice for two centuries in the
National Congress and for more than a century in Nebraska and in many
other states gives abundant assurance that there is no real threat. . .,,179
Lynch involved the constitutionality of a holiday display that included a
creche. The Court found the display constitutional because "[t]he creche in
the display depicts the historical origins of this traditional event long
recognized as a National Holiday."'8 0 Tribe has argued that "[iln both
Lynch and Marsh, the Court implied that history had similarly neutralized
the religious effects of the practices challenged in those cases."'' Opinions
173. 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
174. Id. at 778.
175. Id. at 782. However, the use of the Christian cross in municipal seals is far from fully
resolved. See Chicago Tribune, Sept. 17, 1990, § 1, at 7, col. 4 (discussing the pending oral
argument before the Seventh Circuit of the constitutionality of two municipal seals). In fact,
the lawyer (Richard Gutman) challenging the seals invoked the community approach in his
comments to the media. Id. ("Putting crosses on seals-the symbol of a town's authority-
probably doesn't affect Chnstians, but it does affect non-Christians. It makes them feel like
outsiders.").
176. L. TimE, supra note 72, § 14-15, at 1295.
177. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
178. 465 U.S. at 668.
179. Id. at 795.
180. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
181. L. TRiNE, supra note 72, § 14-15, at 1295.
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written by Justices PowellI1 2 and O'Connor' appear to confirm Tribe's
analysis.
Breadth analysis's" also has an effect on the community inquiry. An
example is the Court's decision in Allegheny The case dealt with the
constitutionality of two holiday displays. The first, a creche m a county
courthouse, was held unconstitutional.' The second display was composed
of a Christmas tree, a Menorah and a banner stating that the display was
a celebration of liberty and diversity in the community.8 16 The Court found
this display to be consistent with the establishment clause. Justice O'Con-
nor's explanation of the constitutionality of that display hints that the
breadth of the beneficiaries of a government practice has a strong influence
on the outcome of analysis under the community inquiry-
Here, by displaying a secular symbol of the Christmas holiday season
rather than a religious one, the city acknowledged a public holiday
celebrated by both religious and nonreligious citizens alike, and it did
so without endorsing Christian beliefs. A reasonable observer would, in
my view, appreciate that the combined display is an effort to acknowl-
edge the cultural diversity of our country and to convey tolerance of
different choices in matters of religious belief or nonbelief by recognizing
that the winter holiday season is celebrated in diverse ways by our
citizens. 11
This explanation suggests that the breadth of individual beliefs recognized
by the display mimnuzed the risk that nonadherents would consider them-
selves relegated to the status of "outsiders" in the community
There can be little doubt that those in Purdy who favor social dancing
feel like outsiders within that community Rule 502.29 is not saved by its
"history and ubiquity" given the history of divisiveness that has surrounded
the Rule. If anything, the Rule's history indicates that it has been a
continuous source of divisiveness in the community "I This history of
divisiveness distinguishes the Purdy dance ban from the practices involved
in Marsh and Lynch. Instead, "[t]o the residents of Purdy-especially the
students of Purdy R-II High School-the rule's message is unmistakably
182. "The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, was based primarily on the
long histoncal practice of including religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas." Wallace,
472 U.S. at 64 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring).
183. "[T]he 'ustory and ubiquity' of a practice is relevant because it provides part of the
context in which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice
conveys a message of endorsement of religion." Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3121 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurrng)).
184. See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
185. For a description of that display, see Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3093-94.
186. Id. at 3094-95.
187 Id. at 3123 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
188. See supra notes 12-37 and accompanying text and mfra notes 210-18 and accompanying
text; N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, § 1, at 30, col. 1 ("It had become an annual ritual, of sorts:
students seeking a change in the policy, the Purdy School Board saying no.").
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clear: the school district promotes the tenets of the local religious commu-
nity."'8 9 This endorsement clearly sends a message to adherents "that they
are insiders, favored members of the political community "19o The fact that
the nonadherents must drive more than sixty miles away when they wish to
dance' 91 is a perfect example of outsider status. The sixty mile drive could
not be a more apt metaphor for the isolation from the community that the
opponents of Rule 502.29 must feel.192
3. The Coercion Approach as an Alternative to Analysis Under
the Effect Prong of the Lemon Test
The coercion approach is the alternative suggested by those Justices who
wish to abandon the effect prong of the Lemon test. 93 Analysis under the
coercion approach is considerably more deferential to the actions of gov-
ernment. 94 Despite the strong opposition to this approach by a majority of
the Court, 195 the Eighth Circuit's panel opimon appears to have embraced
the coercion approach.'96 This Note posits that, while proof of coercion is
unnecessary to find that Rule 502.29 violates the establishment clause, the
Purdy dance ban fails to survive even this lower level of scrutiny
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Allegheny is the source of the coercion
inquiry 197 Kennedy stated that "government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in any religion or its exercise... "19 He went on
to state that "coercion need not be a direct tax in aid of religion or a test
oath. Symbolic recognition or accommodation of religious faith may violate
189. Clayton, 889 F.2d at 196 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). This message is magnified in Purdy
by letters to the local paper with messages such as the following: "The Baptists of Purdy
outnumber all the rest of the Protestants and Catholics. Not only are we the church, we are
also the state. We have the right to say what goes on at our school." Quoted in N.Y. Times,
Nov. 2, 1986, § 1, at 30, col. 1.
190. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
192. The distnct court eloquently observed that "[tihe right to dance may not be a tenet
of the Methodist, Catholic, Lutheran or Mormon Church, but the children of these faiths
cannot be made to feel that their religions are inferior because their churches do not prohibit
(and in some cases, actually sponsor) dances." Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 856.
193. See supra note 60.
194. Justice Blackmun stated that "when all is said and done, Justice Kennedy's effort to
abandon the 'endorsement' inquiry in favor of his 'proselytization' test seems nothing more
than an attempt to lower considerably the level of scrutiny in Establishment Clause cases."
Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3109 (Blackmun, J.).
Justice O'Connor observed that requiring "a showing of coercion, even indirect coercion,
as an essential element of an Establishment Clause violation would make the Free Exercise
Clause a redundancy." Id. at 3119 (O'Connor, J., concurrng).
195. See supra note 60.
196. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 60.
198. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3136 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the Clause in an extreme case." 199 Unfortunately, Kennedy provided precious
little guidance to a court attempting to apply his approach beyond "requiring
a showing that the symbolic recognition or accommodation advances religion
to such a degree that it actually 'establishes a religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so.2'00 However, cases with facts similar to those in Clayton
may help to illustrate Kennedy's position.
Estate of Thornton v Caldor, Inc.201 concerned the constitutionality of
a Connecticut law that gave employees an absolute right not to work on
their chosen day of Sabbath. The Court found this law unconstitutional
because:
In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on employers and employees
an absolute duty to conform their business practices to the particular
religious practices of the employee by enforcing observance of the
Sabbath the employee unilaterally designates. The State thus commands
that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular
interests at the workplace The employer and others must adjust
their affairs to the command of the State whenever the statute is invoked
by an employee. 2
The Court went on to quote approvingly the following statement of Judge
Learned Hand: "'The First Amendment gives no one the right to insist
that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to
his own religious necessities. '203 Yet that is precisely what has happened
in Purdy, Missouri.
Rule 502.29 is coercive in that those religiously opposed to social dancing
used their political power to force a duly elected governmental body to
kowtow to their demands. 204 This is coercion in its purest form: the Ministenal
Alliance in Purdy sought to prevent nonadherents from engaging in a purely
199. Id. at 3137 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). However, Kennedy provided
only one example of this "extreme case"- "[Tlhe Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent
erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall." Id.
200. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
201. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
202. Id. at 709.
203. Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
204. See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text. The establishment clause would mean
little under the coercion approach if an inquiry into the linkage between the coercive govern-
mental action and religious groups is not allowed. The absence of such a linkage provides an
easy way for a church to establish a state religion: start by convincing the legislature to
implement the more obscure, less universal tenets of their faith. After all, the establishment
clause does not specify which religion is forbidden to be established (every religion is). And
without conducting an inquiry into the linkage of government actions to the beliefs of specific
religious groups, courts will be unable to determine whether or not a religion is being
"established." An alternative approach would provide exceptions to the establishment clause,
and would in fact discriminate against more established religions, since only religions with
universally recognized tenets such as days of Sabbath would be precluded under the establish-
ment clause.
This case is no different than Estate of Thornton. See supra text accompanying notes 201-
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secular activity because their beliefs counseled that the activity was wrong,
In essence, the religious community of Purdy, "'in pursuit of their own
interests [insisted that] others must conform their conduct to [the Ministerial
Alliance's] own religious necessities. '" ' 201 After all, the dance ban was not
necessary to ensure the free exercise of the rights of the members of the
Ministerial Alliance. Those opposed could simply have forbidden their
children from attending the dance. Thus, the sole object of the Purdy dance
ban was to coerce those who did not accept the Alliance's religious position
into abstaining from dancing in Purdy's public schools.
That the school did not prohibit dancing away from school grounds does
not, as the Eighth Circuit panel would have it,206 prove the absence of
coercion; rather, it merely minimizes the potential coercive impact. "That
a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does not
elimnate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to
conscience and outside the school's domain.' '207 Because a law prohibiting
activity within school grounds extends to "matters sacred to conscience and
outside the school's domain" 20 proves that Rule 502.29 has a coercive
impact on the thinking of the young. If the young are anesthetized to minor
encroachments by religion into the public sphere, then the stage is set for
much larger encroachments when the young grow up. In the words of
Madison, "it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our
liberties.' '209
C. The "'Excessive Entanglement" Prong of the Lemon Test
The third and final prong of the Lemon test requires that a statute "'not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' 210 A subsidiary
03. If no religion had a day of Sabbath, there would be no coercive effect on employers.
Thus, the universality of the existence of religions with a recognized day of Sabbath was the
key to the holding. The same causality approach applies in Clayton. Were it not for the
religious opposition to dancing, there is no question that Rule 502.29 would not exist.
205. Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 710 (quoting Otten, 205 F.2d at 61).
206. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
207. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 856.
208. Id.
209. TiE COMPLETE ' MADISON: His BASIC WiTnNos (S. Padover ed. 1953), reprinted in
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 54 n.3.
210. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970)). The prohibition against excessive government entanglement with religion is
based on two concerns:
When the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomnation in matters of
religious significance, the freedom of religious belief of those who are not
adherents of that denomination suffers, even when the governmental purpose
underlyiiig the involvement is largely secular. In addition, the freedom of even
the adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into
sacred matters.
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1985).
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concern of the excessive entanglement prong is "the divisive political po-
tential of these state programs. "211
The district court in Clayton found the excessive entanglement prong of
the Lemon test applicable to Rule 502.29 because of the "extreme divisive-
ness" of the dancing issue in Purdy. 212 The Eighth Circuit's panel opinion
properly rejected the applicability of the excessive entanglement prong as
an independent basis for invalidation because "[p]olitical divisiveness along
religious lines is not a proper consideration except in cases involving
financial aid to parochial schools. ' 213 While the panel's reading of Supreme
Court precedent is accurate, 2 4 it is too literal.
211. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. The Lemon Court went on to observe:
[P]olitical division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against
which the First Amendment was intended to protect. The potential divisiveness
of such conflict is a threat to the normal political process. It conflicts with
our whole history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion Clauses to
assume such importance in our legislatures and in our elections that they could
divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level
of government.
Id. at 622-23 (citations omitted).
212. Clayton, 690 F Supp. at 856. The court stated that "[t]here is no question that the
dance issue is deeply divisive in the Purdy area, nor is there any question that it has been a
divisive issue for many years." Id. The court went on to describe "[tihe elaborate steps the
school system took to ensure that dancing would not occur " Id. The court concluded
that "[t]he excessive caution surrounding anything connected with dancing suggests the
extreme divisiveness of this issue." Id.
Additional evidence of divisiveness includes hate mail and death threats sent to dance
supporters. See Newsday, May 10, 1990, § II, at 4 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file) (Dance
supporter Joan Fox stated that "[w]e stopped counting the hate mall and the death threats
after a while.") One Purdy woman thought that her divorce was at least partially attributable
to the divisions created by the dancing debate. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1988, § A, at 10, col. 5
("It [the dancing debate] causes fist fights in school, angry glares in church, conflicts at home.
'I won't say it caused my divorce exactly, but it surely didn't do any good."').
213. Clayton, 884 F.2d at 379. The panel also argued that "[i]f anything, the rule promotes
less, rather than more, school involvement in what plaintiffs contend is a religiously significant
activity." Id. This argument confuses the fact that opposition to dancing is religious, not the
act of dancing itself. The panel's position on this point would force government to cease all
activity that any religion disagreed with, because continuation of the activity would cause
government to be "entangled" with religion over that activity. In essence, the court's position
would force government to favor religion, giving it almost a veto power over activities engaged
in by the rest of society.
214. The panel based its conclusion on strong dicta taken from footnotes in two Supreme
Court cases. The Court in Mueller stated:
Since this [political divisiveness] aspect of the "entanglement" inquiry originated
with Lemon v. Kurtzman, and the Court's opinion there took pains to distinguish
both Everson v. Board of Education and Board of Education v. Allen, the Court
in Lemon must have been referring to a phenomenon which, although present in
that case, would have been absent in the two cases it distinguished.
The Court's language in Lemon respecting political divisiveness was made in
the context of statutes which provided for either direct payments of, or
reimbursement of, a proportion of teachers' salaries in parochial schools. We
think the language must be regarded as confined to cases where direct
financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial
[Vol. 66:315
DANCING IN THE DARK
The panel failed to recognize that excessive entanglement still plays a role
in applying the Lemon test to cases where the entanglement is not monetary.
Justice O'Connor, who wants to abandon the excessive entanglement inquiry
as an independent prong of the Lemon test, has argued that "[p]ervasive
institutional involvement of church and state may remain relevant in deciding
the effect of a statute which is alleged to violate the Establishment
Clause. . .,"21- However, the panel failed to consider the divisiveness
caused by the Rule in its effects prong analysis.
Surely the existence of divisiveness cannot be demed. Before the pro-
dance forces took their fight to court, the community was sharply split
along religious lines. The magnitude of the division was made clear at the
School Board meeting, where the panel would have us believe the citizens
of Purdy turned out in record numbers to contest the minmal cost of a
dance. 2 6 Comments made by Purdy residents in the wake of the Supreme
Court's certiorari denial indicate that the divisions in Purdy have hard-
ened.
21 7
The evidence of sharp political division along religious lines over an issue
that is unremarkable when viewed in its secular context would have done
much to enlighten the panel's effect prong analysis. The usefulness of this
evidence is magnified when one remembers that effect prong analysis de-
pends on the subjective perception assigned to the law by the persons
affected. 218 Given the split along religious lines, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that the proponents of dancing will consider the continued
existence of Rule 502.29 as evidence that the Purdy School Board embraces
the theology of the Ministerial Alliance.
CONCLUSION
There is little dispute over the accuracy of the district court's portrayal
of the events recounted in Clayton. Given the strength of the evidence
schools.
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403-04 n.i1 (emphasis added). This language was quoted approvingly in
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988).
215. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 430 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797-
98 ("[W]hile the prospect of such divisiveness may not alone warrant the invalidation of state
laws it is certainly a 'warning signal' not to be ignored.") (citation omitted) (quoting
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 125-34, explaining the fallaciousness of this as-
sumption.
217. School Board President Glenn Garrett optimistically stated that "[t]hs is not the time
or place for the board to gloat. It is time for the board, administration, faculty, students,
and the Purdy citizens to set about healing the divisions caused by this litigation." Chicago
Tribune, Apr. 17, 1990, § 1, at 4, col. 3.
However, the comments of others indicate that the healing process will not be easy. Joan
Fox, one of the parents who filed the Clayton suit, characterized the Court's certiorari denial
as "an extreme victory for liars, cheats, and hypocrites." Id. at § 1, at 4, col. 5. Mrs. Fox's
son, Howard, stated that "[u]ltimately, we will dance on their graves, figuratively." Indiana
Daily Student, Apr. 19, 1990, § 1, at 7, col. 1.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41 and note 161 and accompanying text.
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identified by the district court, one would have to speculate that the Eighth
Circuit panel made a willful decision to disregard the evidence. While this
is only speculation, a review of opiniots written by Judge Fagg (the author
of the Clayton panel opinion) demonstrates a tendency to defer to the
governmental unit when the action at issue is a result of the democratic
process. 2 9 Although a general critique of this majoritarian paradigm .is
beyond the scope of this Note,2 the majoritarian paradigm should not be
invoked where the case is "about religious, tyranny-"2 2 '
The Eighth Circuit panel apparently felt that Rule 502.29 was the result
of the democratic process: the School Board meeting was an example of
direct participatory democracy. However, the Bill of Rights was passed to
curb the excesses that participatory democracy may create. Rule 502.29 i§
an example of democratic excess. But the most troubling aspect of the
panel's deference is that there is no reason to believe that the Ministerial
Alliance, building on its court victory, will not go further in the future.
219. See, e.g., Felton v. Fayette School Dist., 875 F.2d 191, 193 (8th Cir. 1989) (Rejecting
a challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) to a school district "good citizenship" rule, which
was used to exclude a student from an off-campus vocational education program. Judge Fagg
wrote that the "good citizenship"' rule served the legitimate purpose of "protectling] the
integrity of its off-campus programs and maintain[ing] those programs' community support."
Judge Fagg argued that "it is not our task to second-guess Fayette's administrators concerning
the wisdom of their rule."); Lubavitch, Inc. v. Walters, 873 F2d 1161, 1163 (8th Cir. 1989)
(Judge Fagg joined an opinion by Chief Judge Lay holding a state law that prohibits erection
of unattended religious symbols on state grounds to be a valid time, place and manner
restriction despite the fact that the state's avowed purpose was to avoid clashing with the
establishment 'clause.); Jacobsen v. Harris, 869 F.2d 1172, 1174 (8th Cir. 1989) (Rejecting a
free speech challenge to a city ordinance requiring anyone wishing to place a newsrack on city
property to acquire a permit and liability insurance. The court held the ordinance to be a
valid time, place and manner restriction advancing significant interests of safety, aesthetics
and space allocation.); Hill v. Blackwell, 774 F.2d 338, 343 (8th Cir. 1985) (Rejecting a claim
that a prison regulation prohibiting facial hair violated free exercise rights of a Muslim inmate.
Judge Fagg's opimon was based on giving "proper deference" to prison officials, despite the
fact that the district court found the prison's security rationale to be exaggerated.); Salinas v.
School Dist. of Kansas City, 751 F.2d 288, 290 (8th Cir. 1984) {Granted a summary judgment
motion dismissing a religious group's challenge to the board rule-giving greater scrutiny to
rental requests from religious groups. Judge Fagg wrote that "the board's retention of authority
to consider applications of some religious groups to assess the complex issues concerning the
Establishment Clause" is "a reasonable justification.").
220. For an extensive -discussion of the majoritarian paradigm, see Chemerinsky, Foreword:
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HAzv L. Rav 43 (1989). Chemerinsky described the roots
of the paradigm as follows:
Not surprisingly, those who disagree with Supreme Court decisions often have
articulated their criticism in terms of the anti-democratic nature of judicial review.
Judicial invalidation of legislation appears anti-majontarian, and arguments -ap-
pealing -to 'democratic values always have had great power in American society.
Moreover, it is often easier to criticize a decision as -usurping democracy than it
is to debate the substantive desirability of the ruling.
.Id. at 62.
221. Clayton by Clayton v. Place, 889 F.2d 192, 195 (8th -Cir. 1989) (Gibson, J., dissenting
from the denial of a rehearing en banc), cert. dented, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
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The panel was untroubled by the possibility that "[t]he breach of neutrality
that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging tor-
rent . ."m Judge Gibson aptly stated:
In the overall scheme of things, a dance at Purdy high school, with an
enrollment of 519, may not be of earth-shattering significance. Yet, our
Constitution protects all citizens, including the students at Purdy high
school, from religious, as well as political, oppression by a majority
The first amendment rights of those students sound a call this court
should not ignore, Our denial of the petition for rehearing en banc
turns a deaf ear to the pleas of those students.m
This conclusion is compelled by the application of even the most lenient
establishment clause inquiry.
It can only be hoped that the Eighth Circuit's disposition of Clayton will
not encourage fundamentalist-dominated communities in Missouri, or any-
where else, to make similar or even more intrusive forays into the realm of
secular society. A loss of liberty, including ironically the freedom to live
according to one's own spiritual values, would be the ultimate price of this
judicial "deference."
222. School Dist. of Abington v, Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
223. Clayton, 889 F.2d at 195 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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